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Abstract

This study links corporate reputation, as measured by Fortune
magazine's Most Admired list, with firm financial performance.
Seven measures of financial risk and return were collected for a
sample of 149 firms from two time periods, 1981 and 1986. The
mean score of four attributes from the 1993 Fortune Most Admired
list for the sample was then analyzed with the financial data
through regression analysis. Two financial variables, Standard
Deviation of the Market Return of the Firm and Return on Sales,
explained between .12 and .14 of subsequent reputation.

The

implication for management is that they can affect a firm's
subsequent reputation by lowering financial risk and controlling
costs.
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Investment bankers, corporate managers, recruiters, among others,
routinely rely on reputations of firms in making a variety of
decisions.

A firm's reputation sends signals to these

stakeholders about its products and business strategies compared
to other firms within similar industries.

Favorable reputations

have been linked to the generation of above average returns for a
firm, job candidates• initial decisions about pursuing contact
with a firm, and in some cases, the firm's social responsibility
(Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Fryxell and Wang, 1994; Gatewood,
Gowan and Lautenschlager, 1993; and McGuire, Sundgren and
Schneeweis, 1988}.

The purpose of this study was to examine the

relationship between a firm's past financial performance and its
subsequent reputation over an extended period of time.
The relationship between a firm's reputation and its financial
performance is complex. There are various reasons for this
complexity.

The first reason is that it takes profit to have the

funds to invest in socially responsible activities.

Cyert and

March (1963) proposed that if an organization has slack, e. g.,
excess profits, this creates opportunities for the organization
to invest in more socially responsible behaviors that satisfy
stakeholder expectations than if the firm has little or no slack.
To the degree that firms with slack do engage in discretionary
socially responsible programs, these programs may increase the
firm's reputation over later periods of time.

Those firms

without slack are at an economic disadvantage and therefore have
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less resources available to direct toward socially responsible
behaviors.

A second reason for this complexity is explained through
stakeholder theory.

Cornell and Shapiro (1987) and Chakravarthy

(1986) suggest that all stakeholders must be equally satisfied.
Every firm has a broad range of stakeholders. Satisfying one
group can be at the expense of another group. Cornell and Shapiro
divide stakeholders into two groups; those that have an explicit
contract with the firm (e.g., stockholders, bondholders) and
those that have implicit contracts with the firm (e.g.,
customers, employees).

If the implicit contract stakeholders

become dissatisfied, they may try to exchange their implicit
contract into a more explicit one. For example, if employees
doubt the firm's implied employment contract, they may choose to
unionize and thus create an explicit agreement. Besides the
direct increase in dollars, an explicit agreement generally
limits the firm's flexibility in work policies and procedures.

The third reason is that corporate reputation often represents
stakeholders' perception of the quality of the firm's management.
Researchers have found that stakeholders view a firm's reputation
for social responsibility as one indication of its top managers'
ability to effectively manage the firm within the changing
environment (Alexander and Bucholtz, 1978; Bowman and Haire,
1975; Miles, 1987; Sethi, 1975; Sonnenfeld, 1981; and Ullmann,
1985).

A decline in a firm's reputation for social

5

responsibility may signal to stockholders that top managers are
not scanning and interpreting their environment accurately and
that management changes may be necessary to achieve a better
"fit."

Perceptions of a firm's low social responsibility may also
decrease the firm's ability to obtain capital at consistently
favorable rates. Investors may consider less socially responsible
firms to be riskier investments because of the possibility of
government intervention.

In contrast, if a firm is viewed as

socially responsible, it may have a relatively low financial risk
as a result of its more favorable relationship with the financial
community.

Firms that can borrow at lower rates can more easily

satisfy their stakeholders claims than firms without this ability
(Cornell and Shapiro, 1987). Socially responsible firms also . may
have lower perceived market risk because they appear more
sensitive to external events and thus are able to anticipate and
'control' their changing environment.

Another reason for mixed results in this field is that many
researchers have used concurrent measures of social
responsibility and economic performance.

McGuire, et al. (1988)

studied the relationship between financial performance and social
responsibility over a ten-year period.

There was little

association between concurrent measures of social responsibility
and stock-based measures of performance, although three
accounting-based measures (return on assets, total assets and
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operating income growth) were significantly correlated with
firms• social responsibility.

A firm's past financial

performance effect on its subsequent reputation for social
responsibility has met with mixed results.

Return on assets,

sales growth, and asset growth were positively correlated with
later perceptions of social responsibility.

Risk measures

correlated negatively with corporate social responsibility
suggesting that a "low-risk firm and a firm with high return on
assets will later have an image of high social responsibility
(McGuire et al.,

p. 865) • 11

Risk and return on assets were able

to predict between 19 and 13 percent of a firm's future social
responsibility reputation.

McGuire et al. (1988) suggest that

future researchers consider financial performance as a variable
influencing social responsibility reputation rather than social
responsibility reputation influencing financial performance. over
time, firms with high financial performance and low risk may be
better able to afford to act in socially responsible behaviors
than firms with low performance.

High concurrent correlations between social responsibility and
financial performance may be artifacts of a researcher's
measurement system.

Since a firm's current financial performance

may be explained partially by examining the firm's previous
performance, researchers need to use longitudinal designs that
measure performance at several points in time.
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Furthermore, without a widely accepted measure of social
responsibility, it is difficult for researchers to replicate the
findings of others.

The literature reflects three widely used

measures of social responsibility.

First, experts are asked to

evaluate a firm's corporate policies according to some
established criteria.

The validity of this measurement resides

in the expertise of those persons making the assessments.
Second, researchers have used content analysis of corporate
annual reports and other documents to assess a firm's social
responsibilities.

Unfortunately, many of these documents are

often of more public relations than informational value since
many annual reports are written by professional public relations
staffs.

A third method has been to use Fortune magazine's list

of the most admired companies.

This measure has been widely used

in prior studies {McGuire, et al., 1988; Fombrun and Shanley,
1990; Gatewood, et al., 1993; Chakravarthy, 1986).

The use of

the Fortune index is not without limitations. Fryxell and Wang
{1994) state that the Fortune data base provides an accurate
measure of a firm's financial performance and should be used to
complement other measures of a firm's performance as part of a
multiple measurement strategy.

Their factor analysis indicated

that the Fortune reputation index loaded on two factors-financial ends and capabilities and strategic means--that are
highly correlated.

They indicate that the raters• judgments are

heavily influenced by their financial evaluation of the firm and
argue that the distinction between the factors, as independent
constructs, is unlikely.

To assess a firm's reputation for
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social responsibility over time, we used four of the five items
that Fryxell and Wang labeled capabilities and strategic means.
These items measured the quality of management, its overall
talent, and its relationships to key stakeholders.

METHODS

Data

Data on a firm's reputation were obtained from Fortune magazine's
annual survey of corporate reputations. Fortune has conducted the
survey for the past 11 years and published summary results in the
January/February issue called "America's Most Admired
Corporations."

Over 8,000 executives and outside industry

experts are asked to rate organizations within their industry on
eight attributes: financial soundness, long-term investment
value, use of corporate assets, quality of management,
innovativeness, quality of products or services, wise use of
corporate talent and community and environmental responsibility.
The rating scale is from o (poor) to 10 (excellent).

The Fortune survey was chosen for several reasons. First, it
provides comparable data over an extended period of time for a
large number of firms in thirty-two diverse industries. Firms
enter and leave the data set over time due to mergers or other
changes in performance, but the sample is relatively stable.
Second, the quality of respondents is comparable to those that
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could be obtained elsewhere since respondents only rate firms
with which they are familiar. They have direct access to industry
information that is salient to assess a firm's reputation. Third,
McGuire, et al. (1988), Gatewood, et al. (1993), Fombrun and
Shanley (1990), and Fryxell and Wang (1994) have used the
instrument as a measure of a firm's reputation.

This permits us

to relate our findings to a broader body of literature.

To further refine the measure to reflect social responsibility,
four of the eight attributes rated by

Fortune's panel of

industry experts were chosen as measures of social responsibility
for this study. The four attributes are: quality of management;
quality of products and services; ability to attract, develop and
retain talented people; and community and environmental
responsibility.

The- logic for selecting these four attributes is

that three of the other measures used by Fortune are surrogate
measures of a firm's financial performance. The fourth Fortune
attribute, a measure of innovation, measures how well management
responds to all its customers' demands for innovative products
andfor services.

Fortune (1993) indicated that while financial

performance indicators had the most impact 9n a firm's
reputation, how a firm's management responded to its key
stakeholders was a better measure of its reputation than
financial indicators. A corporation becomes "most admired" by
increasing shareholder wealth and through positive relations with
key stakeholder groups.

Key stakeholders include: customers,

represented by the quality of products and services rating;

10

employees, represented by the measure of the ability to attract,
develop and retain talented people; and the environment,
represented by the community and environmental responsibility
rating.

Managing stakeholder relations and being aware and

proactive to changes in the business environment is represented
by the quality of management rating on the Fortune index (Miles,
1987; Sonnenfeld, 1981; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Chakravarthy,
1986; and Parket and Eilbert, 1975).

A varimax factor analysis was performed on these four items to
empirically confirm that four items used to measure a firm's
reputation loaded on a single factor. A single factor was
extracted (Eigenvalue of 3.48) that explained 87 percent of the
variance. To evaluate the internal consistency reliability of the
four rating scales, we calculated a coefficient alpha. A
coefficient alpha of .95 was obtained indicating a high
internally consistent measure. These four items were averaged to
arrive at a score representing a firm's reputation for social
responsibility. Although some modification in a firm's ratings
might be expected' over time, we examined the ratings of a sample
of 200 firms in the 1992 and 1993 Fortune list. The relationship
between these ratings was .92, indicating a firm's relative
stability in its ranking over time.

Measures of Firm Performance
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Ullmann {1985} has argued that conflicting results may derive, in
part, from different measures of financial performance. For
example, studies examining the relationship between social
responsibility and accounting-based measures of performance have
generally reported positive results (Parket and Eibert, 1975;
Bowman and Haire, 1975}. Cochran and Wood {1984} also found a
positive relationship after controlling for the age of a firm's
assets.

Spicer {1978b} and Aupperle, Carroll, and Hatfield

(1985} found no relationship between market-based measures of
performance and social responsibility.

To address prior conflicting results due to the use of either
market or accounting measure of performance, we used a
combination of market based measures of risk and return and
accounting measures of return. The market measures of risk are:
standard deviation of the market's average return (STDV},
standard deviation of the market return of the company (STDC},
the correlation coefficient between the market rate of return and
the average firm's market return(R} and Beta. Beta (BETA} is
calculated by dividing the sum of the covariance of the market
(STDV times R} and the covariance of the firm (STDC times R} by
the squared variance of the market (STDV squared}.

The accounting measures included return on sales (net income
divided by sales}, asset turnover (sales divided by assets},
leverage multiplier (assets divided by equity}, and retention
rate (!-dividends divided by net income).

The rationale for
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choosing the accounting variables was to represent measures of a
firm's efficiency (ROS), production (AT), quality financing (LM),
and opportunities for the use of capital (B). Retention (B)
represents the firm's ability to invest capital in opportunities
that will provide a better rate of return to shareholders than
dividends. These measures provide data to the investor on whether
the rate of return is sufficient to justify the risk. The
accounting variables can also be combined to create the more
popular measures of return; Return on Equity and Sustainable
Growth.

Periods of Analysis

This study collected from COMPUSTAT seven measures of risk and
rate of return from companies on the 1993 Fortune list for two
time periods: 1981 and i986.

The survey data reported in the

1993 Fortune list was collected in 1992 and reflects a firm's
1991 financial performance. Thus, a five and ten year time lag
was employed.

Various studies have used a five year (Alexander

and Buchholz, 1978; Aupperle, Carroll and Hatfield, 1985; Bowman
and Haire, 1975) and ten year (Abbott and Monson, 1979;
Sturdivant and Ginter, 1977; Cochran and Wood, 1985 and McGuire,
et al., 1988) period of time to study the relationship between a
firm's financial performance and its reputation.

Since return on

sales and asset turnover do not have the same meaning in
r egulated industries, onl y non-regulated firms were include d in
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the final sample. A total of 149 non-regulated firms were on the
final list.

RESULTS

The study hypothesized that prior financial performance would be
a salient predictor of a firm's future reputation as a socially
responsible institution. Furthermore, we hypothesized that firms
with higher financial returns will have achieved a higher score
on Fortune's Most Admired List than firms with lower financial
returns.

Table 1 shows the correlation between a firm's financial

Insert Table 1 about here

performance in 1981, 1986 and their reputation in 1993.

The

level of correlation between prior firm performance and later
corporate social responsibility is weakly supported. The standard
Deviation of the Market (STDC) is negatively correlated with
subsequent social responsibility for both years. This indicates
that managers of firms that do not deliver the financial results
expected by their shareholders were later perceived as being less
socially responsible than managers of firms who delivered
financial results expected by their stakeholders. Return on sales
{ROS) was positively associated with later reputation. ROS
measures the control of costs associated with obtaining sales. If
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a firm was able to control these costs, it was rated as being
more socially responsible than firms that were not able to
control these costs.

There are mixed results for the other

financial measures and later reputation.

The data in 1981 suggest that low-risk firms (as measured by
Beta) and firms with high return on equity will have an image of
high social responsibility.

Unfortunately, the 1986 data

indicate no support for this conclusion.

High ROE in 1981 was

positively associated with a good reputation in 1993. Once again,
the 1986 data did not replicate these findings.

To test the multivariate relationship between corporate social
responsibility and prior financial performance, we conducted two
regressions. Since the financial performance data are somewhat
correlated with each other (average correlation is r=.16; R
<.05), care must be taken when interpreting these regressions.
The results of the stepwise regressions for 1981 and 1986 using
Fortune's ratings of social responsibility in 1993 as the

independent variable indicated that only two financial measures-STDC and ROS--entered into the equation. The data in Table 2
indicates that 13 percent of a firm's reputational rating in

Insert Table 2 about here

1993 could be explained by a combination of STDC and ROS in 1981.
STDC explained almost 10 percent of the variance, while ROS
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contributed 4 percent. The results from using a firm's 1986
financial performance were similar to 1981 financial indicators.
STDC explained almost 9 percent of a firm's reputational rating

in 1993, and ROS contributed 3 percent.
DISCUSSION

The narrowest implication for management from our results is to
control costs and deliver a return to investors as close to their
expectations as possible. By achieving these goals, managers can
control an average of 12% of their subsequent reputational score.
This however, is a highly simplistic explanation. It is
functional to look further into the question of stakeholder
expectations to understand this relationship. Cornell and Shapiro
(1987) theorize that stakeholders hold certain levels of
expectations and will remain satisfied when their expectations
are met. But what happens when their expectations are not met? If
they don't get as much as they expected, they may choose to force
a more explicit contract. Stockholders and institutional
investors may become active and demand representation on the
board. Customers may ask the government to intervene if they
believe their expectations are ignored. All of these actions will
cost the organization some autonomy in the way they conduct their
business.

The results of this study suggest that in order to have the
autonomy to operate the business franchise, management must be

16

aware of and deliver the financial results expected by their
stakeholders. This implies a much broader connection to
stakeholders than previously conceptualized by past researchers.
The traditional view of business as separate from society has
evolved to how business legitimizes itself with society.

The

traditional way a business contributes to society and meets
stakeholder expectation is through financial performance. Yet
this suggests a precarious position for management; profit must
be earned to 'pay' off the expectation of stakeholders, yet
shortcuts that may lead to greater short-term profit may also
create dissatisfaction with other stakeholders. This
dissatisfaction could then result in a lower reputational score
in subsequent years and a decline in profitability.

Miles (1987), Ullmann (1985) and Cyert and March (1963) all
theorize that the ability to manage their environment is a
complex managerial process. Considerations included are the
amount of power the stakeholders possess, the philosophy of top
management on how to relate to the environment, and the amount of
slack earned by past economic and behavioral performance. These
researchers also make the point that a firm is most admired when
it can transform itself to take advantage of changes in an
unknown and changing environment.

Firms must have slack in order

to be ready to take action when it is needed.

The most admired

firms in our sample were able to generate more slack (Return on
Sales) than less admired firms over time and therefore, enjoyed a
higher subsequent reputation.
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This study contributes to the understanding and theory that the
construct of social responsibility ultimately seems to reflect
the quality of management. The quality of management is the
ability to anticipate problems and opportunities to meet
expectations of all stakeholders and to be proactive in dealings
with multiple stakeholders and the environment. The results from
the study suggest that management will lower market risk by
performing in a consistent manner. since most investors are risk
averse and the classic tradeoff is risk vs. return, short-term
profit should not be the sole goal of management. The implication
for management is that accommodating the needs of multiple
stakeholders is a legitimate objective of the firm.
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Table 1
Correlation Between Corporate
Social Responsibility and Firm Performance

Performance Indicators, 1981

Social Res12onsibility, 1993 (a)

STDC

-.31**

Beta

-.17*

ROS

.31**

AT

-.07

LM

-.07

ROE

.17*

Performance Indicators, 1986
STDC

-.29**

Beta

.13

ROS

.29**

AT

-.06

LM

-.09

ROE

-.03

*

R < .05

**

R < .01

(a) This is the average of the four items.
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Table 2
Results of Regression Analysis
Predicting 1993 corporate social Responsibili ty

Financial Performance, 1981
Beta

STDC

-0.378
5.26

ROS

Adjusted

T

F

R2

-2.71**
2.65**

11.89**
.13

Financial Performance, 1986

STDC
ROS

-0.35

2.52**

2.59

2.52**

10.21**
.11

**

12 < .01
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